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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAMES WEBB, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent, : 
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THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division of : 
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Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner, 
PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS* 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah NoiWProfit : 
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The petition in this case was taken from the decision entered by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Webb v. University of Utah. 2004 UT App 56, 88 P.3d 664. The court of 
appeals reviewed an order of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing the negligence 
claim brought by plaintiff James Webb (Webb) against defendant University of Utah (the 
University) based on a slip and fall. The court of appeals reversed the district court, 
holding that Webb need not show a special duty owed to him as an individual in order to 
recover against the University. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of 
the court of appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The court of appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a special 
relationship, the University can be held liable in negligence for injury sustained by a 
student on a field trip. 
2. The court of appeals erred in concluding that the allegations of the complaint 
suffice to establish a special relationship between Webb and the University. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
There are no determinative provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, or 
regulations which control the circumstances present in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Webb filed his complaint in this case in September, 1999 (R. 1-3) (Addendum A, 
attached), alleging, as to the University, that it negligently conducted a scheduled class 
field trip by "taking the class into a dangerous area," resulting in injuries to him (R. 2, 
% 12). The claim also alleged that Webb's injuries were caused by his classmate, 
codefendant Jonette Webster, who "slipped on the ice, and while attempting to steady 
herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete" (R. 2, |^ 11). The University 
moved to dismiss Webb's claim against it under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R. 18-26) on 
the ground that, under Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), the 
University was under no special duty to Webb that would confer liability. After Webb's 
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response (R. 35-38) and the University's reply (R. 47-57), the district court heard the 
motion (R. 72), which was granted by order entered January 31. 2000 (R. 73-75) 
(Addendum EL attached). 
On February 28, 2000, Webb filed a notice of appeal (R. 79-80) from the district 
court's order dismissing the claims against the University with prejudice (R. 73-75). This 
Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice as taken from a non-final order. See Webb 
v. Univ. of Utah. No. 20000181-SC (R. 87-89) (Addendum C, attached). Webb then 
moved the district court to certify the order of dismissal as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(b) (R. 90-96). On October 11, 2000, after the judge granted the Rule 54(b) motion 
by minute entry (R. 99-100) but before an order was entered, Webb filed a second notice 
of appeal (R. 111-12). Once the order was entered on October 24, 2000 (R. 115-16), a 
third notice of appeal was filed on November 1, 2000 (R. 117-18). This Court transferred 
both the second and third appeals to the court of appeals for disposition, where they were 
consolidated and dismissed for improper certification. See Webb v Univ. of Utah, Nos. 
20000881-CA and 20000980-CA (R. 139-40) (Addendum D, attached). 
Following the dismissal of the last party remaining before the district court by 
order entered November 13, 2002 (R. 150-52), Webb filed his fourth and final notice of 
appeal on November 20, 2002 (R. 153-54). This Court transferred the appeal to the court 
of appeals (see Appellate Docket, Webb v. Univ. of Utah, No. 20020985, at 12/23/2002). 
Following briefing and argument, the court of appeals entered its decision on March 11, 
3 
2004, reversing the district court's dismissal of the University (R. 73-75) and remanding 
the case for further action (2004 UT App 56, ^ 1 11) (Addendum E, attached). The court of 
appeals held that M[t]he University owes its students the duty to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care when it directs students to engage in specific activities as a part of its 
educational instruction" (id.). The court also observed that "were a special relationship 
required in this case, the facts alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish" one (id,, % 10 
n.6). On April 9, 2004, the University petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which 
was granted by order of June 10, 2004. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The relevant facts in this case are few. On March 7, 1998, while he was a student 
at the University of Utah. Webb participated in a scheduled class field trip which was 
conducted outdoors on non-University property (R. 2, ffl| 6-7 and 9). During the field trip, 
a fellow student slipped, causing Webb to fall and become injured (R. 2-3, ^ ft| 11 and 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reversing the district court's dismissal of Webb's claims against the University, 
the court of appeals held that (1) the public duty doctrine does not apply to this case, and 
(2) even if it does, the allegations of the complaint established a special relationship, 
allowing Webb's negligence claim to go forward. Neither of these conclusions finds 
support in precedent. This Court has consistently held that absent a duty owed to the 
plaintiff specifically, a state defendant bears no liability for harms due to negligence. The 
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court of appeals' decision reduces the state to the role of an insurer—a determination 
fraught with fiscal and political ramifications of the kind the legislature is in the best 
position to weigh. 
If taking a class into a "dangerous area" is enough to create a special relationship, 
the result is to eviscerate the public duty doctrine by making every relationship special. 
Given the complaint's admission that Webb's injury was directly caused by his fellow 
student's attempt to steady herself, his relationship to the University is indistinguishable 
from that of his student colleagues. Moreover, accepting a plaintiffs mere presence at the 
scene of his injury as adequate to create a special duty fosters the kind of artful pleading 
that this Court has consistently rejected. 
Because the court of appeals' decision is inconsistent with both the reasoning and 
result of prior cases, it merits reversal here. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review: "On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court 
of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same standard of review used by 
the court of appeals." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998). 
The court of appeals applied a correctness standard "[bjecause the propriety of a dismissal 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a question of law." Warner v. DMG 
Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102, ^ j 6, 20 P.3d 868; consequently, this Court also applies a 
correctness standard. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether 
5 
it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review/1 
Clark v. Clark. 2001 UT 44, ^ 8, 27 P.3d 538. 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A STATE ENTITY AND AN 
INDIVIDUAL IS REQUIRED FOR LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE. 
It is well settled that under Utah law, 
[t]o prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four essential 
elements: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the 
defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered 
injuries or damages. 
Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); accord Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of 
Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah App. 1992). This Court recognized in Beach the 
indispensability of the duty element: "One essential element of a negligence action is a 
duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by defendant. Absent a showing of a duty, 
Beach cannot recover." Beach, 726 P.2d at 415 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, 
"[t]he issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court." 
Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 897. In Hunsaker, the Court held that "[t]he State defendants in 
the instant case owed no duty to Hunsaker or the other plaintiffs under the standards set 
out in our prior decisions. No facts are alleged here that could bring into play the special 
relationship duty which would be a necessary premise for any negligence liability of the 
State actors." Id, at 897 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, in any claim of 
negligence against a state actor, the element of duty cannot be fulfilled in the absence of a 
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special relationship between plaintiff and defendant. This principle is embodied in the 
public duty doctrine, which, in this Court's words, 
provides that although a government entity owes a general duty to all 
members of the public, that duty does not impose a specific duty of care on 
the government with respect to individuals who may be harmed by 
governmental action or inaction, unless there is some specific connection 
between the government agency and the individuals that makes it 
reasonable to impose a duty. 
Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, U 12, 980 P.2d 1171. As enumerated in Day, 
[a] special relationship can be established (1) by a statute intended to 
protect a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a 
particular type of harm; (2) when a government agent undertakes specific 
action to protect a person or property; (3) by government actions that 
reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the public; and (4) 
under certain circumstances, when the agency has actual custody of the 
plaintiff or of a third person who causes harm to the plaintiff. 
Id at H 13. 
None of the Day factors is present in this case. Webb has pointed to no statute 
intended to protect a class of which he is a member from injury incurred in a slip and fall. 
He has not alleged that the University took specific action to protect him from a slip and 
fall. He has not shown detrimental reliance on any University action intended to prevent 
him from slipping and falling. Nor has he shown that the University had actual custody 
of either Webb or the fellow student he claims caused his fall and consequent injury. 
The court of appeals' decision acknowledges that in order to prevail on a 
negligence claim, a plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant owes him a duty of 
care. However, the court Mdisagree[s] that Webb must demonstrate a special relationship 
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with the University" (2004 UT App 56 at 1j 6) to establish that duty. The court's 
disagreement and resulting decision conflict with the public duty doctrine as articulated in 
numerous precedents from its own and this Court's jurisprudence. 
This Court has long held that n[f]or a government agency and its agents to be liable 
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of the public, the plaintiff must show 
a breach of duty owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an obligation owed 
to the general public at large by the governmental official." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1989). The court of appeals has likewise recognized that "when the 
government deals generally with the welfare of all, it does so without a duty to anyone, 
unless there is a 'special relationship' between the government and the individual." 
Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1993). Utah's appellate courts 
have consistently applied this principle in a variety of factual contexts to numerous 
negligence-based claims against governmental defendants. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, the plaintiffs sued the defendant state actors for failing to 
discharge their statutory duties in licensing and supervising a finance company. This 
Court, finding no duty owed to the plaintiffs as individuals, reiterated the standard 
articulated in Ferree that "[t]o hold a government agency or one of its agents liable for 
negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff cannot recover for the breach of a duty owed to 
the general public, but must show that a duty is owed to him or her as an individual." 
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In Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989), Owens selected Garfield as a 
daytime babysitter for her young son. After the child sustained serious and permanent 
injuries at Garfield's hands, Owens sued, among others, the state and county for failing to 
warn her about prior child abuse investigations of, and charges against, Garfield. This 
Court rejected Owens1 claim, finding the public entities had no special relationship with 
either Owens or Garfield on which liability to Owens could be premised. 
In Rollins v. State, no special relationship was found to support liability of the 
Utah State Hospital when one of its patients left hospital grounds, stole a car, and killed 
another driver when he lost control of the stolen vehicle. Rollins v. State. 813 P.2d 1156, 
1161 (Utah 1991). Even the dissent agreed that "[traditionally, a government tort-feasor 
has been accorded a special status with regard to the duty question." 813 P.2d at 1165 
(Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). As the dissent further explained, "Under the 
public duty doctrine, liability against a government for torts committed against an 
individual must be premised on the violation of a special or particular duty owed the 
individual plaintiff rather than on the violation of a general duty owed the public as a 
whole." kf Nothing in the doctrine, as articulated in appellate decisions and 
acknowledged in the Rollins dissent, limits the applicability of the public duty doctrine to 
particular kinds of negligence; rather, "[u]nder the doctrine, a duty to all is a duty to 
none." IdL The public duty doctrine is entrenched in Utah appellate decisions. See Obrav 
v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 19, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) (finding the duty of a public 
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sheriff to investigate a crime is "not pursuable by an individual since the public official's 
duty is to the public"); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 539 (quoting the language from the Rollins 
dissent); Cannon. 866 P.2d at 588; Day, 1999 UT 46, H 12. 
The court of appeals in the present case discounted these precedents as 
inapplicable because the duty it held the University owed to Webb "is not a duty to 
protect, but rather the University's duty not to act negligently in providing instruction." 
2004 UT App 56, % 6. The court concluded that "[t]herefore, the special duty doctrine 
relied upon by the University is not helpful." IdL Prior case law does not support the 
distinction drawn by the court of appeals; in fact, that court's own precedent belies it. 
The court of appeals explained the rationale behind the public duty doctrine in 
Cannon v. University of Utah. The Cannon plaintiffs were struck by a vehicle in a 
marked crosswalk while crossing the street from a University-owned parking lot to attend 
a basketball game on University property. Although the University had assigned two 
police officers to assist in traffic control at the crosswalk, the officers were sitting in their 
car when the plaintiffs crossed. Finding the University owed no duty to the plaintiffs 
beyond that owed to the public at large, the court affirmed summary judgment for the 
University. In explaining that the public duty doctrine precluded liability, the court 
observed that "[ajbsent such a doctrine, the government would be discouraged from 
adequately providing any general protections or services for the public." Cannon, 866 
P.2d at 589 (emphasis added). The language of the court's decision, rather than 
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distinguishing between a state defendant's positive acts and failures to act. embraces both. 
By encompassing both positive acts and omissions to act, the public duty doctrine assures 
that outcomes will be based not on the artful characterization of a claim, but on its 
operative facts.1 
This Court's language in Day also belies the court of appeals' attempted distinction. 
Analyzing the public duty doctrine, the Day court observed that a general duty to the 
public at large "does not impose a specific duty of care on the government with respect to 
individuals who may be harmed by governmental action or inaction" 1999 UT 46, |^ 12 
(emphasis added). Under the court of appeals' analysis, the government's liability for 
negligence would depend completely on whether the claimed harm is characterized as 
action or inaction, in direct contradiction to the standard articulated in Day. A standard 
*Utah appellate cases have consistently rejected the recharacterization of claims to 
avoid valid defenses or to obtain tactical advantages. See Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 
335, 336-37 (Utah 1997) (rejecting recharacterization of claim based on attorney 
discipline as action in fraud to avoid jurisdiction of Utah Supreme Court); Ledfors v. 
Emery County Sch. DisU 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993) (rejecting recharacterization 
of claim arising from battery as arising from failure to supervise in order to avoid 
governmental immunity defense); Bullock v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d 1215, 1217 
(Utah App. 1998) (rejecting recharacterization of claim for recovery of property as 
contract claim to avoid statute of limitations defense); DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882 
P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah App. 1994) (rejecting recharacterization of claim based on plat 
approval as one based on negligent road design in order to avoid governmental immunity 
defense). Notably, in DeVilliers, one judge would have "decide[d] this case based on the 
absence of a 'special duty' owed to this particular plaintiff by these defendants." 882 P.2d 
at 1167 (Bench, Judge, concurring in result). 
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permitting different outcomes on the basis of artful pleading elevates form over substance 
to reach a result not supported by decided case law. 
Both of Utah's appellate courts have recognized that their decisions are constrained 
by legislative choices. The court of appeals, noting in Lamarr that M[t]he public duty 
doctrine is a creature of common law/' stated. "Lamarr basically argues the legislature 
abrogated the common law doctrine in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Although the supreme court in Ferree and Rollins expressly rejects this argument, we 
note the legislature could abrogate that common law doctrine if it chose to do so in 
specific terms." Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 539 n.4. The Lamarr court cited Norton v. 
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991) for the principle that the "legislature has [the] last 
word with respect to tort law." 828 P.2d at 539 n.4. At no time in this case has Webb 
cited to a Utah statute abrogating the public duty doctrine or a binding precedent asserting 
its abrogation. As the Court has recognized in the line of Governmental Immunity Act 
cases arising from assault and battery, plaintiffs who find themselves without a remedy 
may, like Webb, find the result unconscionable, but their remedy, like Webb's, lies with 
the legislature, not with the courts. See S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) 
("Plaintiffs may find the immunity given by the legislature unconscionable, but their 
remedy lies with that same legislature."); see also Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1167 (observing 
that the court is "constrained by the plain language of the [Governmental Immunity] Act 
and our prior case law" despite "the legislature's power to permit all plaintiffs to whom 
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the government owes a duty of care based on a special relationship to bring suit for 
injuries arising out of a breach of that duty") (emphasis added). 
If the court of appeals' decision is sustained here, the University, and other state 
agencies, will become the guarantors of public safety regardless of the circumstances 
producing injury. Just as Cannon suggests, the end result may be a curtailment in state-
provided services. For example, if the University owes a duty to all spectators attending 
its sports events—absent a special relationship—it may choose not to provide traffic 
control services near the venue, an outcome that may increase the risk of harm to the 
public at large. If it owes a duty to any adult student on a field trip for any injury 
sustained during the trip—without a showing of some factor that would entitle him to a 
higher level of protection than other students—the University may respond by curtailing 
field trips and other educational exercises because the duty, as this Court explained in 
Beach v. University of Utah, is "realistically incapable of performance, or . . . 
fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship." Beach, 726 P.2d at 
418. The court of appeals' holding that a duty exists in the present case, even in the 
absence of a special relationship, fundamentally alters the character of the University 
experience. Moreover, because the court of appeals' decision articulates no limiting 
principle, allowing the decision to stand threatens the state fisc, diverting resources from 
programs and services for public benefit to individual claims for damages based on 
unforeseeable dangers and unpreventable accidents. This Court's precedents show that 
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the weighing of factors on which to predicate such expansive public liability is a function 
entrusted to the legislature. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEBB AND THE UNIVERSITY. 
Although the court of appeals held that it was not necessary for Webb to show a 
special relationship with the University in order to establish the existence of a duty, it 
observed, in a footnote, "that were a special relationship required in this case, the facts 
alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish a special relationship." 2004 UT App 56 at 
f 10 n.6. As the basis for this conclusion, the court stated, "Where one party controls 
another party's acts, a special relationship exists because the controlling party 'assumes 
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her normal opportunities 
for self-protection.'" kf (quoting Beach, 726 P.2d at 415). The court cited no facts from 
the complaint to support its conclusion that the University assumed responsibility for 
Webb's safety or deprived him of his normal opportunities for self-protection. Merely 
exposing him to an allegedly dangerous area does not, under Beach, establish that the 
University exerted control over his safety or actions. 
The Beach case involved a student who was injured on a required overnight, 
University-sponsored field trip. Analyzing the duty element of Beach's negligence claim, 
this Court held that because Beach had not established that she was distinguishable, in 
any relevant particular, from the rest of the students on the field trip, the University had 
14 
no special relationship with her on which a duty could be premised. Consequently, the 
University had no liability for her injuries. 
In deviating from the Beach analysis, the court of appeals' opinion focused on a 
single factual distinction between the Beach and Webb cases while ignoring relevant 
similarities. The court stated that M[t]he crucial difference between Beach and the facts in 
this case is that Webb's fall occurred while Webb was acting pursuant to instructions 
given by the University during course work. The University directed Webb to cross the 
condominium complex, whereas Beach was acting on her own when she fell." Webb, 
2004 UT App 56 at ^ 8. The allegations of the complaint do not support the court's 
statement. The complaint alleges only that the University took the class "into a dangerous 
area." R. 2 at J^ 12. Nothing in the complaint speaks to crossing the condominium 
complex, let alone taking any particular route pursuant to direction by the University. 
Instead, it appears from the complaint that the students were simply standing at the time 
of the accident: "While standing on the sidewalk, Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on 
the ice, and while attempting to stead herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the 
concrete." R. 2 at j^ 11. Common to both the Beach and Webb cases is the undisputed 
fact that it was not the exposure to an allegedly dangerous area that caused the plaintiffs' 
injuries, but circumstances over which the University had no control: Beach's own 
actions and Webb's classmate's fall. 
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Unaddressed by the court of appeals' opinion in the present case is the fact that 
even though the Beach defendants were on notice that Beach, unlike Webb, was 
distinguishable from her fellow students in several ways, the distinctions were not 
significant enough to set her apart for purposes of a special relationship. She lacked 
experience in the relevant activity, camping. Unlike her fellow students, on a prior field 
trip she had been discovered by the instructor to be asleep in the bushes near camp after 
becoming disoriented following an incident of underage alcohol consumption. This Court 
nonetheless affirmed summary judgment for the University in Beach, holding these facts 
insufficient to confer any enforceable duty on the University. Webb, in contrast to Beach, 
articulated no facts distinguishing him from the other students on the field trip during 
which he was injured. 
The facts of Beach illuminate the standard needed to show a special relationship 
and enforceable duty. In Beach, the district court "assumed arguendo that the University 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect and supervise Beach, but concluded that 
there was no breach of that duty." Beach, 726 P.2d at 415. As this Court observed on 
review, 
At the time of the final field trip, Beach had attended other field trips 
and had had no further incidents. She evidenced the judgment and skills of 
any normal twenty-year-old college student. There was nothing to suggest 
that she was not in good physical condition; in fact, on the final trip she 
joined several other students in rappelling from rocks located just above the 
area where she was later injured. 
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Beach, 726 P.2d at 416. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that "[ujnder these 
circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that Beach's situation was not 
distinguishable from that of the other students on the trip; therefore, no special 
relationship arose between the University and Beach." Id. The Court concluded that 
M[b]ecause no special relationship existed, the University had no affirmative obligation to 
protect or supervise her and no duty was breached." Id. 
Applying the Beach standard to the facts of the present case, there is even less 
reason to hold the University liable for Webb's injuries than for Beach's. It is doubtful 
that the public sidewalk on the condominium site where Webb was injured was inherently 
more dangerous than the rugged terrain to which Beach was exposed. Webb's complaint 
articulates no historical facts that could possibly have put the University on notice that he 
was in need of special assistance or was otherwise distinguishable from the other students 
on the field trip. Under the analytical framework of Beach, the University cannot be held 
liable to Webb for his unfortunate, but unforeseeable, accident, because a special 
relationship is absent. 
In reaching its decision in this case, the court of appeals relied in part on Beach's 
citation to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1964) to show a special relationship 
based on the court's view that the University had asserted control of Webb (see 2004 UT 
App 56 at % 10 n.6). However, its reliance is misplaced in light of this Court's 
modification of the Restatement's approach. In Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
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231 (Utah 1993), the Court explained that it did not reject the possibility of institutional 
duty "to specific individuals or narrow classes of individuals who for some reason were 
distinguishable from the mass; we only rejected claims for broad categories of special 
relationships which operatively seem to be indistinguishable from a general negligence 
theory." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. The Court further noted that it does not "apply the 
Restatements precise formulation uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based 
approach in determining whether a special relation should be said to exist and 
consequently whether a duty is owed." Id at 236. Rejecting "the Restatements 
mechanistic relational models[,]" kf at 237 n.5, the Court deemed its own narrower 
approach more realistic than "a broad reading of the Restatement, especially when one 
considers the fact that at bottom, the issue is one of negligence—a lack of reasonable 
care—as opposed to what actions of others it would be nice to be insured against." IcL at 
237. 
As explained in Higgins, the public duty doctrine does not preclude the application 
of a reasonable care standard once a duty is shown. Rather, it permits liability under the 
reasonable care standard only where a public entity has reason to know that particular 
individuals—not a broad class—are placed in unreasonable jeopardy by the entity's action 
or inaction. Under Higgins, that duty involves a "pragmatic, policy-based analysis" that is 
"consistent with the practical realities" of the parties' relationship. IdL In the present case, 
the court of appeals failed to analyze the consequences of imposing a duty on the 
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University to prevent an adult student with no apparent or declared disabilities from 
slipping and falling on a field trip. It erred in concluding that simply by taking the 
student into an allegedly dangerous area, the University necessarily assumed 
responsibility for his safety or deprived him of his normal opportunities for self-
protection. See Webb. 2004 UT App 56 at |^ 10 n.6. No such allegations were made in 
the complaint. 
To predicate a special relationship on nothing more than an adult student's 
presence on the site of his injury is to elevate the student-teacher relationship itself to a 
special status—a step this Court explicitly declined to take in Beach. Observing that 
"colleges and universities are educational institutions, not custodial," 726 P.2d at 419. the 
Court explained, "A realistic assessment of the relationship between the parties here 
precludes our finding that a special relationship existed between the University and Beach 
or other adult students." IdL To declare that a special relationship exists here on the basis 
of a single, conclusory allegation that the University was negligent in "taking the class 
into a dangerous area[,]" R. 2, [^ 12, imposes the paternalism Beach rejected and belies the 
analytical framework crafted by Beach, Higgins, and other precedents from Utah's 
appellate courts. Because it is contrary to decided law, the court of appeals' decision in 
this case warrants reversal. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the court of appeals reaches a result that cannot be sustained in 
light of precedent. This Court has consistently upheld the application of the public dutv 
doctrine in negligence actions against state entities. The court of appeals' decision throws 
settled law into turmoil and upsets the balancing of competing priorities for valuable 
public resources, with the potential of making the state a guarantor of every individual's 
well-being regardless of circumstances. For these reasons, as more fully explained above, 
the University lly requests the Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision, vacate its 
opinion, and enter an order affirming the district court's judgment for the University. 
Dated this TMU^ day of July, 2004. 
due 
Nancy t . Kemp 
Sandra L. Steinvoort 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 2M>iW day of July, 2004,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
to the following: 
Brent Gordon 
Driggs, Bills & Day, P.C. 
331 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
ADDENDUM A 
Kenneth A. Bills (#6835) 
DR1GGS. OSBORNL & HUANG 
Attorneys lor Plaintiff 
331 South 600 East 
Sail Lake Cm. Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-9982 
I-ax: (801) 363-8370 
IN THE I111RD JUDICIAL DJS1RJC1 COURI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKF COUN LY. STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WEBB. 
Plaintiff. COMPLAINT 
The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a diusion 
of the State of Utah. PARK PLAZA 
CONDOMINIUM OWNER'S 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff. James Webb, by and through his undersigned eounsel of record, complains and 
alleges against above named defendants as follows: 
1. Plaintiff James Webb is an indhidual and resident of Salt Lake County. State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant University of Utah is a governmental entity of the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Jonette Webster is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County. 
State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Park Plaza Condominium Owners Association is a non-profit 
corporation operating in the State of Utah. 
Case Number: W f f l ^ g ^ 
Judge: rtfyiflfld 
5. Plaintiffs have complied with all procedural provisions of the Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
6. On or about March 7. 1998. Plaintiff was a student in a class held by Defendant 
University of Utah. 
7. As part of the class. Defendant University of Utah had a scheduled "field trip" for 
the class that Plaintiff was enrolled in. 
8. The field trip was. in part, to examine various fault lines in the Salt Lake County 
area. 
9. As part of the field trip, the students were taken to property owned and under the 
control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums. 
10. The sidewalks under the control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums were 
covered with snow and ice. 
11. While standing on the sidewalk. Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on the ice. 
and while attempting to steady herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete. 
12. Defendant University of Utah was negligent included, without limitation, failing 
to obtain permission of landowners before taking a class on a scheduled field trip, and taking the 
class into a dangerous area. 
13. Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums was negligent in failing to maintain a 
reasonable and safe condition on walkways under its control. 
14. Defendant Jonette Webster was negligent in failing to maintain her footing and 
falling, and in grabbing the Plaintiff as she slipped, causing Plaintiff to fall. 
15. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants* negligence, the Plaintiff has 
sustained serious injuries to his body and shock and injuries to his system. All of said injuries 
have caused and continue to cause the Plaintiff great physical suffering and mental pain and 
suffering. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereupon alleges, that said injuries and 
said pain and suffering will be pennanent and will result in permanent disability to the Plaintiff 
16. As a further and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of the Defendants-
Plaintiff has been forced to incur medical bills for medical and hospital attention in an amount 
subject to proof at trial. 
17. Plaintiff has suffered special damages in a sum subject to proof at trial. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount incurred on special damages pursuant 
to the applicable statutes of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE. Plaintiff pray for judgment against the defendants as follows: 
1. For a determination by the Court that the defendants were responsible for the 
various injuries suffered by the Plaintiff 
2. For a judgment against the defendants for special damages in a sum subject to 
proof at trial, as well as interest thereon. 
3. For general damages against the defendants in a sum subject to proof at trail. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this Jg2_ day of August, J 999 
BY: DR1GGS. OSBORNE & HUANG 
.enneth A. Bills 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
1230 Roosevelt Ave 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
ADDENDUM B 
FfiUlJ CIS :
 ; ' ~ i 
Third Judlcii i! L; 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT - 5352 
Assistant Attorney Genera] 
JAN GRAHAM- 1231 
Utah Attorney Genera] 
160 East 300 South. Sixth Floor 
P.O.Box 140856 
Sail Lake City. UT 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorneys for Defendant University of Utah 
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THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division 
of the State of Utah, PARK PLAZA 
CONDOMINIUM OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non Profit 
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Case No. 990909689 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The defendant University of Utah's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court on 
Monday, January 247 2000. The plaintiff was not present but was represented by counsel, 
Kenneth A. Bills. The defendant was represented by Sandra L. Steinvoort Assistant Attorney 
General. 
The Court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted 
by counsel and being fully advised on the matter, now and therefore, hereby ORDER, 
ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
1. That the motion to dismiss is granted and the plaintiffs claims against the 
defendanl University of Utah are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this %( day of Qgyfj^ e ^ ^ O O O . 
BY THE COURT: 
^ £ £ £ 
STEPHEN L. HHNRJOD 
THIRD D I S T R J I T COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DRJGGS OSBORNE & HUANG 
/NNETH A. BILLS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
tt**„ I hereby certify that on this _^*__ day of January. 2000. 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, in the United 
States maii. postage prepaid, to the following: 
KENNETH A BILLS 
DRIGGS OSBORNE & HUANG 
331 S600E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
TERRY M PLANT ESQ. 
PLANT WALLACE CHRJSTENSEN & KANELL 
4 TRIAD CENTER STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS 
JOSEPH J JOYCE ESQ. 
STRONG AND HANNI 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841 ] 1 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JONETTE WEBSTER 
ADDENDUM C 
FILED D&TsXt " C U K I 
Third Jnc.c;ai District 
IW 3 » 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH > L T L K ^ C C o V U 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
James Webb, No. 20000181 - S O 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ^ 09O<?6> flR 
V. 
The University of Utah, a division of 
the state of Utah, 
Defendant University of Utah's motion for summary dismissal is granted. The appeal 
was taken from a non-final order, as parties remain before the trial court and plaintiff did not 
request certification of the dismissal order. The dismissaJ is without prejudice. 
BY THE COURT: 
im^A I,y2-OD& KA^^K^c^ 
Date / • . Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
James Webb, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 20000181-SC 
990909689 
v. 
The University of Utah, a division 
of the State of Utah, Park Plaza 
Condominium Owner's 
Association, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation, and Jonette Webster, 
Defendants and Appellee, 
The above-entitled case was submitted to the court for decision and the attached order has been 
issued. 
Order Issued: May 1,2000 
Notice of Decision Issued: May 2, 2000 
Record: None 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
990909689 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
Deputy Clerk 
Date \ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
] hereb) certify that on May 2, 2000, a true and correct cop\ of the foregoing ORDER and a true 
and correct copy of the NOTICE OF DECISJON were deposited in the dutcd States mail to the 
party(ies) listed below: 
SANDRA L. STEJNVOORT 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160E300S6TI1FLR 
POBOX 140833 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0833 
TERRY M. PLANT 
PLANT WALLACE CHRJSTENSEN & KANELL 
UNIVERSITY CLUB BUILDING 
136 ES TEMPLE STE 1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
JOSEPH J. JOYCE 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 EXCHANGE PL STE 600 
600 BOSTON BLDG 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
KENNETH A. BILLS 
DPJGGS OSBORNE & FIUANG PC 
331 S6TH E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER and the original NOTICE OF DECISION 
were placed in Interdepartmental Mail to be delivered to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKJ5 CITY UT 84114-1860 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No.: 20000181-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , #990909689 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
James Webb, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v . 
KB 2 ? 2001 
Pauteae Stagg 
to^kotthe Court 
University of Utah, a 
division of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER CONSOLIDATING AND 
DISMISSING APPEALS 
Case No. 20000881-CA 
Case No. 20000980-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis. 
These cases represent an appeal from a single order of the 
trial court and are accordingly consolidated under case number 
20000881-CA. 
Our review of the record convinces us that this case 
involving multiple defendants was not properly certified under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Under the rule, "the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Here, 
although the trial court's order stated that "plaintiff shall 
have a final and appealable order, " the court did not make an 
express finding that there was no just reason for delay supported 
by a statement of the reasons for the finding. Bennion v. 
Pennzoil, 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992). A judgment is not final 
"merely because the order so recites." Little v. Mitchell, 604 
P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 1979). 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
i/7 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Plh^ 
fames 
'• the undersigned, 
Appeal*, do " 
fc^Ut true and 
on file in the
 w 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
James Webb, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
University of Utah, a dijvi^sionof the^ State_ ofJJtaJi; Park Plaza 
Condominium Owners' Association, a Utah non-profit corporation; and 
Jonette Webster, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
OPINION 
For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020985-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 1 , 2004) 
2004 UT App 56 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
Attorneys: Brent Gordon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Sandra L. Steinvoort, and Nancy L. Kemp, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
j'age I ot 6 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and T h o m e . 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
%\ James Webb appeals the trial court's order granting the 
University of Utah's (University) motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND11' 
%2 Webb was a student in an earth science course at the 
University. As part of the course curriculum, students were required 
to attend an off-campus field trip to examine fault lines in the Salt 
Lake County area. During the trip, Webb and other students were 
directed to walk through a condominium complex to examine a 
particular fault line. The sidewalks within this private residential 
property were covered with snow and ice, and as Webb and others 
walked on the sidewalks toward the viewing area, one of Webb's fellow 
students lost her footing on the slippery surface. To steady herself, 
she grabbed onto Webb for support and caused Webb to slip on the ice, 
fall to the ground, and sustain injuries. 
13 Webb filed suit against the University and others, alleging 
that the University was negligent by directing students into a 
"dangerous area" on a school-organized field trip. The University 
moved to dismiss, arguing that no special relationship existed 
between Webb and the University that gave rise to a duty on the part 
of the University. The trial court agreed and dismissed Webb's claims 
against the University on that ground alone. Webb appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
54 Webb contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his 
claims against the University when it concluded that the University 
owed Webb no duty. A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "is appropriate 
only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff . . . would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts [the plaintiff] could prove to support the[] claim." Prows v. 
State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). "Because the propriety of a 12 
(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's 
ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard." St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991). "The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of 
law to be determined by the court." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 
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151 (Utah 1989). 
ANALYSIS 
15 "[T]o prevail upon a negligence claim under Utah law, a 
plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant owed 
him or her a duty of care." Youn.9__yv Salt Lake...Ci_ty_S_ch_. Dist., 2002 
UT 64,112, 52 P.3d 1230. Webb characterizes the University's duty of 
care as a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care when 
directing its students to take a certain route on a required field 
trip. The University characterizes the duty differently, as a duty to 
protect Webb from the icy conditions at the condominium complex. The 
University then argues that because the duty is a duty to protect, 
Webb must establish a special relationship between himself and the 
University, which Webb has not. The trial court agreed with the 
University and found that the University did not owe Webb a duty to 
protect him from the icy conditions. 
16 We disagree that Webb must demonstrate a special relationship 
with the University.1"7 The duty alleged in Webb's complaint is not a 
duty to protect, but rather the University's duty not to act 
negligently in providing instruction. Specifically, Webb alleges that 
the University directed him to enter a dangerous area on a school-
sponsored and required field trip. Thus, this is not a case where a 
failure to act is alleged.----•- Therefore, the special duty doctrine 
relied upon by the University is not helpful.-—' See Hunsaker v. 
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993) (finding no special duty to 
protect a member of the general public from a paroled violent felon); 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993} (finding 
no special duty to protect a member of the general public from a 
discharged mental patient); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1161 
(Utah 1991) (finding no special duty to protect a member of the 
general public from an escaped mental patient); Ferree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (finding no special duty to protect a 
member of the general public from a prisoner on weekend release); 
Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1984) (finding no 
special duty to protect a member of the general public from a drunk 
driver who had been stopped by the police). 
17 Further, we conclude that this case is distinct from Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). In Beach, a student 
brought suit against the University for injuries she had sustained 
when she fell from a cliff during a weekend field trip. See id. at 
414. The fall occurred while Beach was voluntarily intoxicated and 
after the daily course work had been completed. See id. On her way to 
her tent at night, Beach became disoriented and subsequently fell 
from the cliff. See id. at 415. Beach argued that the University was 
negligent by failing "to supervise and protect her." Id. The Utah 
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Supreme Court disagreed. It first recognized that M[t]he lav; imposes 
upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special 
relationships exist between the parties." Id. The court then 
concluded that because "Beach's situation was not distinguishable 
from that of the other students on the trip . . . no special 
relationship arose between the University and Beach." Id. at 416. 
Thus, "the University had no affirmative obligation to protect or 
supervise [Beach] and no duty was breached." Id. 
SI8 The crucial difference between Beach and the facts in this case 
is that Webb's fall occurred while Webb was acting pursuant to 
instructions given by the University during course work. The 
University directed Webb to cross the condominium complex, whereas 
Beach was acting on her own when she fell. Beach claimed that the 
University had a special duty to protect her from her own actions, 
but the court found otherwise. We cannot ignore this distinction. Had 
Beach fallen from the cliff after her instructor had directed all the 
students to cross a treacherous path on the edge of the cliff, Beach 
certainly could have stated a negligence claim against the University 
even though Beach's situation was not distinguishable from that of 
the other students. While the University does not have a custodial 
relationship with its students, see id. at 418, the University does 
owe a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care when it 
affirmatively acts in directing its students to perform certain tasks 
as part of its curriculum.x ' 
59 A second case involving the University, Cannon v_1 University of 
Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), also supports our result. In 
CAnJ22n, this court upheld summary judgment for the University where 
the plaintiffs were injured in an auto-pedestrian accident when they 
used an off-campus crosswalk - just off University property while 
walking to a University sporting event. See id. at 587-88. The 
Cannons alleged that the University police were negligent because, 
prior to the Cannons' arrival, the officers had ceased directing 
traffic and were simply sitting in the police car. See id. at 588. We 
recognized that "the officers did not owe any specific duty to the 
Cannons which they did not already owe to the general public." _IdL a t 
590. Accordingly, we held that the University had no special 
^relationship with, and thus owed no duty to, the Cannons. See id. 
510 However, in reaching our conclusion we stated, "it is 
important to note that the Cannons did not rely on the aid of the 
officers when they attempted to cross the street." Id. In other 
itfords, it was crucial that the officers were not directing the 
Cannons into the dangerous area. In this case, Webb alleges that he 
crossed the condominium complex because the University directed 
.students to do so- Just as the officers in Cannon would have owed a 
duty to use ordinary and reasonable care if they had aided the 
Cannons across the street, the University owed a duty to Webb to use 
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ordinary and reasonable care when directing Webb to walk across the 
condominium complex.' ; Thus, the trial court erred when it concluded 
that the University, as a matter of law, owed no duty to Webb. 
CONCLUSION 
Sill The University owes its students the duty to exercise ordinary 
and reasonable care when it directs students to engage in specific 
activities as part of its educational instruction. Webb alleged that 
the University failed to exercise such care when it instructed him to 
cross an allegedly dangerous condominium complex as a part of a 
required field trip. Thus, the trial court erred when it concluded 
that the University owed no duty to Webb.-7' Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
112 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
1. "When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 12 
(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991)- We state the facts of this case accordingly. 
2. Webb also claims that he contracted with the University for the 
performance of a service and, therefore, "[ujnder fundamental 
principles of tort law, the University owed [him] a duty . . . to act 
as a reasonably prudent person when it undertook . . . [to] provid[e] 
educational instruction." However, Webb failed to preserve this issue 
Page 6 of 6 
by raising it in the trial court. Webb does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, Utah appellate courts will not decide issues that are 
raised for the first time on appeal. See Chapma^ 
2003 UT App 383,110, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. Hence, we do not reach 
the merits of Webb's contract argument. 
3. The distinction between act and omission applies generally and 
determines whether a plaintiff must demonstrate a special 
relationship to maintain a negligence claim. See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §§ 302, 314 (1965); see also Beach v. University of Utah, 
726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
314(a) (1964), for guidance). 
4. Were Webb alleging that the University was negligent by failing to 
control his fellow student who caused Webb to fall, the University 
would be correct that the "failure to protect" line of cases applies. 
5. The Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished Breach in a similar way. 
See Delbridqe v. Maricopa County, 893 P.2d 55, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994) (distinguishing "non-curricular activities" from those 
"supervised by the instructor and included in the curriculum"). 
6. Because we recognize that the line between the University acting 
and the University protecting its students is not always easy to 
draw, we note that were a special relationship required in this case, 
the facts alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish a special 
relationship. Where one party controls another party's acts, a 
special relationship exists because the controlling party "assumes 
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her 
normal opportunities for self-protection." Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 314(A) (1964)). "Determining whether one party has an 
affirmative duty to protect another . . . requires careful 
consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at 
large." Id. at 418. Failure to find a special relationship under the 
facts of this case would permit the University to escape all 
liability when it injures students by requiring them to engage in 
activities fraught with unreasonable risks. Such adverse consequences 
for society would require that we find a special relationship in 
these circumstances. 
7. Because we review only whether the University owed Webb a duty, we 
express no opinion whether the facts alleged are sufficient to 
demonstrate a breach of that duty or a sufficient causal link leading 
to Webb's injuries. For instance, if there were safe routes across 
the condominium complex, but Webb chose a dangerous path, it would 
not necessarily follow that the University directed Webb into a 
dangerous area. 
